RELIGION, SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHICAL
DISCOURSE
DONALD R. BURRILL
California State College at Los Angeles, California

There are abroad in the world today two tacit answers to the
perennial question, "What is the meaning of life ? " Characteristic of one answer is the claim that life's meaning is only
understood through revelation. Without revelation, we are
warned, life is meaningless, it leads only to nihilism. Current
revelations are both sacred and secular, sometimes divine
and sometimes demonic. This answer is called the "religious"
answer. The second answer is that only a life of reason can be
meaningful or hold any promise-and by reason, one usually
means a life directed by the judgments of science. Now let me
not mislead the reader into thinking that the way of religion
is irrational or that the way of science does not have its
revelations, its flashes of insight, its moments of ecstasy.
I only wish to make clear what seems to me to be the sine
q.ua non of each.
Philosophy is not, however, satisfied with either answer.
Each, accepted separately, seems to rob man of those elements
of his nature which characterize his humanness, i.e., both
answers taken in isolation remove from him the responsibility
of being an individual. It is necessary of course to defend
this claim. But at the risk of sounding platitudinous, I must
say that we all now live in an age which ill affords any collective dehumanization of man. The continuous stockpiling of
attitudes (in the form of "systems of belief" which fall into
one "camp" or another) fares well to man's tragic extinction.
Thus it seems to me that philosophy's primary task today is
to struggle to re-establish communication between the "religious" and the "scientific" answers in order to foster our
survival. The burden of this paper is to trace the path which
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philosophy seeks to sail if it is not to founder and lose its
significance on the Scylla of religion or in the Charybdis of
science.

Karl Jaspers once wrote that philosophy-even as Christianity-has its "saints. Socrates, Boethius, Bruno-all were
martyred for steering a philosophical course. They are never
considered great philosophers, nor are their philosophical
conclusions particularly important, but they have always
been the "holy," the "set-apart" ones because they perished
for their philosophical commitment. When the scientist
Galileo recanted of his heliocentric universe theory, he needed
merely to bide his time until science revealed the foolishness
of his tormentors. His was, it seems to me, an easy truth.
I t lay within the context of "objectivity." Objective truth
demands objective answers. "The book is on the table." Is it,
or is it not? To affirm the claim or to deny it ends the case
for objectivity. But, when Giordano Bruno refused to recant,
he died on the martyr's pyre. His was a difficult truth-philosophical truth, not scientific truth. Both men acted in keeping
with the truth to which they were committed and for which
they had to stand; but one truth would suffer by retraction,
the other would not.
Galileo's objective truth is a truth which stands without
Galileo. It has the Platonic character of universality about it;
its validity is unhistorical and timeless. However, we should
not allow such a truth to beguile us as it did Plato. I t is not
absolute ; rather, it depends on finite premises and a method
of attaining knowledge which involves stipulative procedures
and pragmatic ends. On the other hand, Bruno could not
recant; for when he reached that point where he believed
that he had plumbed the depths of reality, to deny this fact
would have been to deny his inward sense of integrity; and
what is more fundamental, it would have been completely
alien to his sense of what was true to his experience-in a
"
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phrase, it would have robbed him of his freedom to seek truth.
Galileo acted as a scientist-Bruno acted as a philosopher.
Let us observe what is peculiar to Bruno's philosophical
truth. (I) Philosophical truth is belief accruing from knowledge. To think-and
to think free from contradiction-is
basic. "Cognition" is the primary instrument of philosophy.
The philosophical procedure is never intended to be irrational;
philosophy stands unreconciled to the attempt of any who
would establish the truth upon the irrational. The irrational
is, at its core, merely negation. Therefore there must be
nothing which is not questioned, no secret which is withheld
from inquiry, nothing which is permitted to veil itself. I t is
through the process of critique that meaning, and hence
knowledge, is to be acquired. ( 2 ) The result of such a procedure
frequently acts as a descriptive iconoclasm. Philosophers
consciously seek to pull down man's irrational idols. In a
certain measure they are asking man to analyze his "reason
for his reasons." We might say, man as a philosopher carries
on a dialogue with the "gods," but as a philosopher, one is
frighteningly aware of the fact that the dialogue is onesided
-the conversation proceeds only as he speaks. The gods
remain silent. Therefore, in a subordinate sense, philosophy
is a therapy one conducts with himself as long as he lives
(Wittgenstein)-and this therapy has for its basic principle
the conviction that health (salvation) is only acquired when
man rigorously struggles to apply that uniqueness of his
nature which sets him off from the brutes-his capacity to
think. (3) Finally, philosophy acts as a liaison between the
"ideologists" and the "scientists," in the manner of a translator of alien languages. He seeks to keep open the lines of
communication between idealism and realism, between the
eternal and the temporal.
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Let us consider the philosopher's conversation with both
the religious and the scientific man, beginning with his
confrontation with religion.
There are a t least four significant relationships between
religion and philosophy. Initially, there is the common quest
of both after what is called the "monotheistic abstraction"
(Schrodinger), i.e., the pursuit of unity, the rejection of
desultory idols and of superficial asides, a dogged tracking of
the final answer, the right answer, the "truth," and the
commitment to this "truth," one's ultimate allegiance to the
highest value. Religion traditionally labels its answer with
the honorific title, "God." Philosophers have had many
names for their answer-the good, the true, the beautiful,
the absolute, reality, being.
On the one hand, to the religious, the philosopher's God is
pale, vapid, threadbare-as Blaise Pascal says, the philosopher's God is never the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.
But on the other hand, philosophy distrusts religious images
of God because they are frequently seductive idols, magnified
into proportions which fit the picture world of its pious
followers. Sometimes, in the eyes of the philosopher, religion
can have a cultic aspect-an intense devotion to its conception
of the holy, to its community of believers and to its priesthood,
all combining to make many of the religiously indoctrinated
terrifyingly certain of their beliefs. Frequently the apologists of such cultic manifestations find any disagreement
with their conviction merely the aberrational mutterings
of untransformed pagans. Philosophers must guard themselves against such cultic commitment-rather, they must
accede to the individual's complete freedom in his search of
knowledge.
A second relationship important to both religion and philosophy is the principle of faith; but philosophy has a rather
restricted use for the term "faith." Faith, philosophically,
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means the willingness to hold a belief which reaches beyond
the structures of phenomenal verification. Sometimes philosophers refer to this as the "risk of faith" (Kierkegaard).
Philosophical faith involves such a risk-an
intellectual
gamble, or a learned surmise. And the philosopher is very
much aware that his claims might be demonstrated at some
future time, by the process of objectivity, to be sheer nonsense.
However, the philosopher does not intend that such a faith
be understood as a rearguard retreating action, i.e., an attempt
to hold to certain types of unsubstantiated nonsense until
empirical research finds us out. Rather, philosophical faith
is the awareness in man as an autonomous creature that overbelief (James) is the indispensible basket in which all descriptions of reality must be carried. Man's overbeliefs sustain
him psychologically and provide for him goals which protect
him from stagnation. Faith acts as a catalyst for creativity
and is the conceptual foundation of values; ostensibly faith
is the ground of man's idealism.
Also it seems to me that the conception of prayer exhibits a
third possible relationship between religion and philosophy.
Prayer is, philosophically, the personification of one's quest
after the absolute answer. Prayer is the legitimate mode of
"hypostatizing" what one considers ultimate-that
which
demands our worship, that which we are prepared to kneel
before. Einstein once called this act "my reverence for the
mystery of the Universe." Thus the act of prayer, philosophically, has the effect of making man a devoted and responsive
adventurer in his quest for understanding, rather than indolent and passive.
Finally, the principle of revelation, which is commonly
described by the religious as the immediate and objective
utterance of God-" the light for the path" (Tillich)-need
not be utterly rejected by the philosopher. He too seeks the
final confirmation of reality-of God, if you wish. That is to
say, he also responds to the ecstasy of the "truth," the confirmation of his thought concerning what must be-what is-
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that which is not alien to his conception of what is indeed the
"light on his path."

Obviously much more should be said about philosophy's
dialogue with religion, but now I must turn briefly to the
philosopher's dialogue with science. Philosophy and science
are permanently wedded in one respect-each
establishes
reason and the empirical process as basic to its methodology.
And yet, philosophy is, on frequent occasions, the critic of
science. Space will not permit me to engage in a lengthy
analysis of all the points of contact which these two disciplines
maintain (even if I could), so I shall limit myself to a single
issue : Man's nature.
What is man? How should he be understood? Science
shows us remarkable and highly important things about man;
but as science offers more and more clarity and precision
concerning man, it becomes more and more evident that
this insight compounds the mystery of man's final definition.
Science's need of precision forces it to abandon scope. All
of the variables necessary for an explanation of man (even
if they were all known, which they certainly are not) cannot
be subsumed in a single calculus. Some of these variables must
be sacrificed if any results are to be secured. Man is always
more than he knows about himself. In a biological sense,
man is perhaps best described as a central nervous system
with electrical impulses charging up and down certain vascular
conduits. And yet, this definition only partially describes
man-never is it adequate for understanding man as a mower
of lawns, or a woman under the hair dryer. In so far as we
make our conception of man scientific, we confine ourselves
to the world of masses in motion. We deliberately sacrifice
our conception of man as an individual. But if we seek to
preserve a "something more" about man's nature by reaching
beyond the categories of science, have we actually added
anything more to our understanding of man ? I t is my convic-
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tion that we have. We should not be reluctant to define
man in extra-scientific categories ; in fact, to confine our
definition of man to the precise claims of science is to subtract
much of the experience which we all apprehend to be part of
man. To the question, "What is man?" the answer, "Only
a sophisticated ape," is inappropriate. But why ? Because,
this explanation necessarily fragmentizes man, i.e., biology
only answers some of the questions which torment us concerning our own nature. All explanations-mathematical, physical,
biological, psychological, theological-only encompass segments of our experience.
It is necessary to understand man in a broader, a multidescriptive sense. The task has fallen to philosophy, first to
listen to science's explanations of man, recognize the significance of its objective "truth," then to listen to religion's-or
any other discipline's-reply,
and thus to translate each
system's conclusions in the terms of the other, taking great
care not to destroy the actual description of man through too
severe a bifurcation, or too extreme a reduction.
But while doing this, philosophy must not forget its iconoclastic role. Frequently, for example, philosophy finds it
necessary to question some of the assumptions of religion or
science. Consider the problem which arises concerning
science's inability to give final explanations. Because science
cannot demonstrate phenomenalistically the origin of the
Universe, it does not in itself provide for religion a logical
basis for its metaphysical explanation. An argument ad
ignorarttiam proves nothing. On the other hand, the scientist's
constant obsession with reductionism must also be resisted by
the philosopher. To suggest that man is adequately understood
as a series of electrical impulses is to reduce man to the status
of a mechanism, wholly abstracted from his existence as a
spiritual being. In truth, man must include the religious nature,
the man of the spirit, as well as the biological man.
Essentially, then, the philosopher can neither determine
how the theologian or the scientist must answer his questions,
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nor what these answers will be. Rather, the philosopher is
the interpreter and the critic (as Socrates has urged) who
constantly calls each discipline to account for its assertions.
Perhaps Herman Melville's most lyrical lines depict the
philosopher's place in our contemporary age :
Doubts of all things earthly, and intuitions of some things
heavenly; this combination makes neither believer nor infidel,
but makes a man who regards them both with equal eye.

And so it is that philosophical truth has a strange way of
melting away. For philosophical truth in a sense goes beyond
philosophizing-it is found in experience which is not philosophical but scientific or religious. And when the philosopher
speaks to this experience he is in reality no more, it seems
to me, the philosopher but the scientist or the theologianand that is another story.

